[missing] 153 hl(~~~) I ilC ( UhOll IU]CIS C\t'm boastUtl tilitt in rc.spt'ct to thc htliltling of ~Onlmll!li~lll (diStlihUti()H, IC\OIUtiOllLtl! COIl.SCiOU.SneSS t)f thc people C([Udli/;ltiOll 0f illCOHle, CiC.) ('uha W;tS [dl ;tilt'ad of the So\iet Ullioll. Ilui all attcuipts to insti~`ltc soti;llisil, bv declec, ts Bakunin iol-esaw O\el a CkiltUI! ago, Icads h~cvitahiv to thc enslavemerit of tile people by thc alitilol-it;tl-i;til Statc. Fhey tttcililit to builtl comrlutttisll~ lailed bUcau~c tilC ''ItC\\ .socialist nial1 Call bc formed only within the context of a utw; nti ficc society, based not upon compulsion, but upon volulit;tl! coopcr.ttiorl. Thc attempt i tiled because it was not mipielilelitcci by thoroltgilgoing libertarian changes in the authoritarian structure ot Cuball society. Collnnunization and forming the new m m acittally camouflaged the militarization of Cuba. Castro made this clear: . soda\ I can see an immense army, the army of a highly organized, disciplined and enthusiastic nation ready to fulfill whatever task is set . . . In his speech of August 23, 1968, Castro announced his decision to militarizc the whole island and give absolute priority to the economic battle—and to achieve this, the absolute need for a dictatorship of the proletariat exercised by the Communist Party. (see k; S. Karol;Cuerri//a.s in Power; New York, 1970, p. 447-448, 528) fhe communization? turned out to bc a cruel hoax. It took on the familiar characteristics of typical totalitarian regimes. This stage of the Cuban Revolution has been correctly identified as the Mini-Stalin Era. Mouldmg the New Man according to totalitarian specificat OllS C011tlOtCS the process of training people to become obedient serfs ot the state: and moral incentives becomes a device to enlist the participailon of thc masses in their own enslavement. To their everlasting clcdit the workel-s resisted: ..a uavc of sabotage beset the country s economy. Saboteurs burned a tanIlery in l.as Villas Province, a leather store in Havana, a chickcrl-iced factory in Santiago, a chemical fertilizer depot in I\lanzarlillo. a provincial store belonging to the Ministry of Internai Commerce in Camaguey, and so on. . Castro also gave a long list of acts of sabota~;e in scho~lic :~I.~1 mn h,.Url;r.^ ~ [A~ ', (Karol; ibid. p 447) .. . ~.. ~~~~~.,.~ .~,,~~. The resistance of the people in addition to the suicidal economic adventures of tllc dictatorship hastened the collapse of Guevara s scheme. Relations with Rttssia Since 1968, when Castro endorsed 154 ( /L'clit)NlLlV;ll~i.l, tilC I l>iSI; II ~~ i''`'e,~sillgl! ti`~~~iil~.~tccl ( lt! ;~l1 ;~Itail- . I hc ('uban CCOtlOm! has bCcn CVCil lllOIC closcl! integlatctl into thc N<~vict ~lll~iI SilitC ( tI11~t ill 1'~7' jt~illCt] tilC ('(lllICCt)11 ((~~ttilCil tt11 l coIlonlic Assistancc—cigitt-ll: 11011 l~ussi.u1 cotitl-olletl ecolititllic It;It~illC i~loc). Tlic extent ot Cuba s absolute depcndencc 011 Russian economic suppot-t can be gauged by thc incicase ot Cuba s trade with Russia whicl1 h~ 1972 rcachetl 720~o—~~bout the sanie pelcentaye of trade as Nvith tile Unitccl St;ltes itl the 1950s. According to Vladimir Novikov, Vicc-Prcsidetit of the USSR C (1LIIIC jl of Ministers, tt-ade between Russia and C uba in 1970 amoulited to three billion rubles a year or about three and a half million dollars a day; an incrcasc of 60U'o in four years. (see Carmclo Mesa-Lago; Cuba in ~Ize /971)5—University of New Mexico, 1974, 1~p. 9-11i Ilildel the terms of the economic agreenient between Russia and Cuba, i . the C ubans committed themselves to accepting Russian advice and planning of key hidustries for thrcc years (1973 to 1975, hichisi\e). . . Russia agreed to construct two new textile plants, a new nichel and cobalt combine with a capacity of 30,000 tons a year, thcrmo-muclear plants, a railroad line between Havana and Santiago de Cuba, a factory to rnakc reinforced concrete, reconstruction of Cuban pOI ts, a new tcicvision and radio factory, etc. etc.... (Herbert \lattltcws, Revolution in Cuba; New York, 1975, p. 398, 399) Russian military aid has turned Cuba into one of the most lorillidable military powers in Latin America. In 1970, Cuba reccivcd i ~ . . OllC and a half billion dollars of direct military aid from Russia—double the amount of United States military aid to the rest of Latin America. . . (Juan de Onis, report to the New York Times; May 10, 1970). Through a joint Soviet-Cuban Commission, the USSR not only supervises its military and economic shipments to Cuba, but also exercises de facto control of the Cuban economy. the Russian invasiol1 of It is this dependence which accounts for Castro s conversion to Marxism-Leninism. His brazer~ hypocrisy transcends all respect for trutil. Evcn Herbert Matthews, one of Castro s staunchest admirers, is out l aged ! openly critical of thc Kremlin s [policy of] peaceful coexistence ... bv 1973 he was brazenly asserting that even the attack on the Moncada Barl-acks in Santiago de Cuba twenty years before (1953) was an example of Marxism-Leninism. . . [Matthews quotes Castro] . . . without the extraordinary scientific discoveries of Marx and Engels, and ~ithout the inspired interpretation of Lenin and his prodigious historic Icat [conquest of power in Russian Revolution] a 26th of July could not have heer1 COllCCiVCd of... [Speech on the 20th anniversary of the \1OIlcada attack] 155 . . . this l;tctually was pln-e nonsense. Thcrc was OlilY onc Conlmutlist in thc 1953 attack .Uld he iS a political accident. None of the p.ll tiCipalltS coL]ld have given a thought to Marx, Engels or Lenin, least of all I idcl. C;istro was rewritil1g history to suit. . .political needs. . ." (il~icl. 1~ lt3()) C astro's ulllestrained flattery ol his Russian saviors, rivals the praise heaped upon .Stalin by his idolatrous sycophants. A front page featured report of Rrezhnev's visit to a new vocational school under the Ite.idlhte: BREZHNEV INAUGURATES V l. LENIN VOCATIONAL SCIIOOL, reads: "Dear C omrade Brezhnev: During whole months the teachers, workers, students and students of this school and the construction workers were preparing for your visit.. ." "WE WELCOME YOU WITH THE GREAT AFFECTION YOU DESERVE AS GENERAL-SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAI COMMITTEE OF THE GLORIOUS PARTY OF THE SC)VIET UNION. . . " APPLAUSE! "It's a great honor and a reason for deep joy and satisfaction for all of us that this school bearing LENIN'S BRIGHT AND GLORIOUS NAME should be inaugurated by you, who now occupies his distinguished place in the Communist Partv of The Soviet Union. (APPLAUSE) ~ ~d Ly W1 1 11~ "ETERNAL GLORY TO VLADIMIR ILYIICH LENIN!" (APPLAUSE!) "LONG LIVE THE INDESTRUCTIBLE FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN CUBA AND THE SOVIET UN ION "' (APPLAUSE AND SIIOUTS OF "LONG MAY IT LIVE!) PATRIA O MUERTE! VENCEREMOS! (SHOUTS OF: "VENCEREMOS'") (OVATION) (GRANMA February 10, 1974) It is axiomatic that relations between states are not guided by ethicalmoral considerations. To promote their interests states do not hestitate to resort to the most revolting treachery and hypocricy. The conduct of the Cuban government confirms this universally acknowledged fact. Castro established friendly relations with Franco-fascist Spain. Maurice Halperin remarks that: -- . . . in 1963 mutual economic benefits proved stronger than icieology ..and by the end of the year all references to 'fascist Spain' disappeared from the Cuban media. . . trade between Cuba 156 and Spahl increased ~rom eleven million dollars in 1962 to approxhnately one hundred and three million dollars in 1966— making Spahn (:uha's third most Important trading partner..." (ibid p. 304) Castro went so far as to agree in 1971 in a trade agreement with Spain to pay Spain for all expropriated Spunish owned property nationalized by Cuba. (see Matthews, p. 405) /`griculture The economic expert on Cuba, Carmelo Mesa-Lago, concludes that " . . . agriculture, especially sugar, the backbone of the Cuban economy, has had a discouragingly bad performance under the Revolution since 1961...according to the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO) total agricultural output in 1969 was 70,10 below that of 1958 (before the Revolution). tCuba in the 1970s; University of New Mexico, 1974, p.56) Even Dumont, the distinguished agronomist, after recalling that Castro boasted that Oriente Province would be producing 1.3 million litres of milk daily by 1969 reversed this optimistic prediction and admitted in his 26th of July, 1970, speech that "...in the first half of 1970 milk production decreased by 25°70. In 1968 beef deliveries were 154,000 tons—for 1970, deliveries decreased to 145,000 tons; and Castro declared that we may end up with a (further decline in livestock. . . " (Is Cuba Socialist? New York, 1972 pp. 90 - 142) (The economist Lowery Nelson calculates that yearly per-capita meat consumption fell from seventy pounds in 1958 to only 38 pounds in 1972. See Matthews, ibid p. 367.) Cubans have been living on a severely restricted diet since rationing of foodstuffs and other necessities was introduced in 1962. Dumont severely castigates the Castro regime for this tragic situation. He deserves to be quoted at length: "...given its fertile land, its level of technique, its tractors, its fertilizers—all infinitely superior to China's resources—there is no reason for Cuba's failure to end shortages of fruits and vegetables that have been going on since 1961 . . . neglect of people's needs for food amounts to contempt. . .(ibid. p. 142) " . . . instead of the green belt for Havana, I had proposed in 1960 (to make the city practically self-sustaining in fruits, vegetables, etc.) . . tin 1969, the peasants forced to plant only sugar cane or coffee, who had formerly suppled the city, now became consumers instead of providers of food...the vegetable and fruit crop for Havana Province decreased from 90,000 tons in 1967 to 70,000 tons in 1970..." (ibid. p. 67) 157 ". . . i~~ 1969 ('astro pr-omisctl: 'We'll ha\c SO 111.111~ baninlas. tilat wc won't scil then1 to you. We'll (ilVE- them to you.' 13ut 1 saw mile UpOI1 mile of hallana piantatio~ls where the trees wele clyhlg because tllcy were planted in poorly clrainccl soil . . . t hc avcrapc peasant would have avoided this. gross error. . .there were only enough banar1as t'or ill people and children. . . no onc could buy a single banarla; and this in a land wher-e bananas were not a luxury, but a daily staple preferred to bread... (ibid. p. 90) ". . . Evcrywhere, from 13ayanlo to Elavana, vegetables, fruits and clothing disappeared from the stores. . . shortages which had been bearable until then became shocking and dramatic..." [Dumont attributes much of the shortages and lack of services to the abolition of small shops and severe curtailment of small peasant holdings] . . . when the last small shops and various services went, an important supplementary food source disappeared, because State production [nationalization] was unable to replace it. That nteant that food was in short supply..." (ibid. p. 63) According to Joe Nicholson, Jr., (Inside Cuba: New York, 1974, p. 33) the 1974 monthly ration for each person was 6 pounds of rice, 3 pounds of meat, 3 pounds of beans, 2 pounds of spaghetti, ] 1/7 pounds of noodles, I pound of salt, 12 ounces of flour, 6 ounces of coffee, 15 eggs, 3 containers of canned milk (fresh milk only for children and the aged). Even sugar was rationed to only four pounds per month per person! (According to an announcement monitored on Miami Radio Dec. 1975, sugar is to be removed from the rationing list.) There is no doubt that Castro together with his amateur economic adventurers are directly responsible for the continuing deterioration of the Cuban economy. Their grandiose and impossible 1970 ten million ton sugar goal turned out to be a major catastrophe. Almost the entire working population (including students and others not engaged directly in production) were mobilized in military fashion to work in the cane fields.''. . .many essential activities" (writes Maurice Halperin) "were brought to a standstill. . .this economic nightmare set back the entire economy to its lowest point since the Revolution (Jan. 1, 1959). . .the economy held up only because of massive Russian subsidies. . . " (Rise and Decline of Fidel Castro; University of California, 1972, p. 316) 'I aking full responsibility for this debacle, Castro in a major speech (July 26, 1970) admitted that; ". . tour incapacity in the overall work of the Revolution—especially rnine...our apprenticeship as directors of the Revolution was too costly. . . " (quoted Rene'Dumont; ibid. p. 152) On the extent of waste, inefficiency and mismanagement there is voluminous documentation—a few examples: 158 . . .50.()()0 t~act~~rs inlllortccl since 1959 were usccl tor all sorts ot ~n1n-llt~-,tluctivc pm-lloscs...Llriving to haseball games...visiting relative~, etc. ('ass ro SaILI, '. . . the l'ormer owner ol' a private husincss hacl a tractor. It lastcLI twenty years. But later, when thc ownersl~ip passecl to thc state, a tractor lasted only two, three, or maybe l'our years..."' .. inlportcd equipment lay unutilized for years...rusting on thc docks because the building to house the equipment had not been constructed. . .ill 1971, 120 million cubic yards of water were lost h1 Hawana alone becallse of neglect of maintenance. . . of the waterpipe system. . . President of Cuba Dortico's reported in early 1972...that out of 300 locomotives only 134 were working...a time-loss study published in 1970 revealed that from t/` to '/: of the workday was wasted. . . in late 1973, Raul Castro said that it was common in statc farms that labor costs alone exceeded value of production. . ton one statc farm the annual wage bill was $48,000 while the value of outpttt was $8,000. .. Mesa-Lago; ibid. pp. 33, 34, 37 'l o illustrate the bureattcratic maze choking the Cuban economy, Rene Dumont reveals: ". . . that in Cuba thc exportation of a single case of vegetables involves authorizations for packing, refrigeration, as well as loading. . . this requires the coordination of thirteen government bureaus—none of them in a hurry. . . "(Ibid. p. 90.) E:\cn the pro-Castro economists, Huberman and Sweezy, deplored the bureaucratic structule of the Cuban economy, citing the major agrarian economic agency INRA (National Institute of Agrarian Retorm) as an example: . . . coordination was difficult, often impossible. . . the situation was no better industry. Having all industry under the centralized control of one agency in Havana could not bc but an unwieldy and inefficient arrangement... Socialism in Cuba; New York, 1969, pp. 82-83) Non-Agricultural Production According to incomplete, scanty data gathered by Mesa-Lago, industrial production declined in 1969-1970. It improved in 1972: 48tr0 in steel; 28°70 in beverages; 11°10 in fishing; 44°70 in building materials 410,70 in salt; 200% in refrigeration, etc. There were also increases in thc production of telephone wire, glass containers, plastics, cosmetics and great increases in nickel and copper production. Overall production increased 14°70 in 1972 and 15% in the first nine months of 1973. 159 Information about thc ecorlomic sittlation in Cuba is, as Mesa-Lago puts it, "necessarily fragmentary...thcrc are no accurate statistical data—ancl in many ateas, nOtlC at all—..." Claims by Castro and olticial C uban sources concerning the extent of Cuba's economic progress camlot be verified and "...must be taken very cautiously..." (All above data, Mcsa-l ago; ibid. pp. 52-60) Rene'Dumont also complahls that ". . .the organization of Cuba's economy is such that it has become all but impossible to obtain reliable data. . . " (Is Cuba Socialist?; p. 71) Castro is not overly optimistic about the rate of Cubais future eeonomic progress. He cautions the people not to exp;ct spectacular in . . creases tn product ton : . . . the objectives of our people in the material field cannot be very ambitious. . . we should work in the next ten years to advance our economy at an average annual rate of 6°7n. . . quoted, Mesa Lago; ibid. p. 59 In view of Castro's record of fantastically exaggerated claims and broken promises, the prospects for a significant betterment of the standard of living of the Cuban masses are indeed dim. 160