Section II
	
Anarchist Morality
			
by Peter Kropotkin
 When our ancestors wished to account for what led men to act in one way or another, they did so in a very simple fashion. Down to the present day, certain catholic images may be seen that represent this explanation. A man is going on his way, and without being in the least aware of it, carries a devil on his left shoulder and an angel on his  right. The devil prompts him to do evil, the angel tries to  keep him back. And if the angel gets the best of it and the man remains virtuous, three other angels catch him up and  carry him to heaven. In this way everything is explained wondrously well.  
 Old Russian nurses full of such lore will tell you never to put a child to bed without unbuttoning the collar of its shirt. A warm spot at the bottom of the neck should be left bare, where the guardian angel may nestle. Otherwise the devil will worry the child even in its sleep.  
 These artless conceptions are passing away. But though  the old words disappear, the essential idea remains the same.  
 Well brought up folks no longer believe in the devil, but as their ideas are no more rational than those of our nurses, they do but disguise devil and angel under a pedantic wordiness honored with the name of philosophy. They do not say  "devil" nowadays, but "the flesh," or "the passions."  The"angel" is replaced by the words "conscience" or "soul,"  by "reflection of the thought of a divine creator" or "the  Great Architect," as the Free- Masons say. But man's action  is still represented as the result of a struggle between two  hostile elements. And a man is always considered virtuous  just in the degree to which one of these two elements      --the  soul or conscience--  is victorious over the other  --the flesh or passions.  
 It is easy to understand the astonishment of our great-grandfathers when the English philosophers, and later the  Encyclopedists, began to affirm in opposition to these primitive ideas that the devil and the angel had nothing to do  with human action, but that all acts of man, good or bad,  useful or baneful, arise from a single motive: the lust for  pleasure.  
 The whole religious confraternity, and, above all, the numerous sects of the pharisees shouted "immorality." They  covered the thinkers with insult, they excommunicated them.  And when later on in the course of the century the same  ideas were again taken up by Bentham, John Stuart Mill,  Tchernischevsky, and a host of others, and when these thinkers began to affirm and prove that egoism, or the lust for  pleasure, is the true motive of all our actions, the maledictions redoubled. The books were banned by a conspiracy of silence; the authors were treated as dunces.  
 And yet what can be more true than the assertion they  made?  
 Here is a man who snatches its last mouthful of bread  from a child. Every one agrees in saying that he is a horrible egoist, that he is guided solely by self-love.  
 But now here is another man, whom every one agrees to  recognize as virtuous. He shares his last bit of bread with  the hungry, and strips off his coat to clothe the naked. And  the moralists, sticking to their religious jargon, hasten to say  that this man carries the love of his neighbor to the point of  self-abnegation, that he obeys a wholly different passion from  that of the egoist. And yet with a little reflection we soon  discover that however great the difference between the two  actions in their result for humanity, the motive has still been  the same. It is the quest of pleasure.  
 If the man who gives away his last shirt found no pleasure  in doing so, he would not do it. If he found pleasure in  taking bread from a child, he would do that but this is distasteful to him. He finds pleasure in giving, and so he gives.  If it were not inconvenient to cause confusion by employing  in a new sense words that have a recognized meaning, it might  be said that in both cases the men acted under the impulse  of their egoism. Some have actually said this, to give prominence to the thought and precision to the idea by presenting  it in a form that strikes the imagination, and at the same  time to destroy the myth which asserts that these two acts  have two different motives. They have the same motive,  the quest of pleasure, or the avoidance of pain, which comes  to the same thing.  
 Take for example the worst of scoundrels: a Thiers, who  massacres thirty-five thousand Parisians, or an assassin who  butchers a whole family in order that he may wallow in debauchery. They do it because for the moment the desire of  glory or of money gains in their minds the upper hand of  every other desire. Even pity and compassion are extinguished  for the moment by this other desire, this other thirst. They  act almost automatically to satisfy a craving of their nature.  Or again, putting aside the stronger passions, take the petty  man who deceives his friends, who lies at every step to get  out of somebody the price of a pot of beer, or from sheer  love of brag, or from cunning. Take the employer who  cheats his workmen to buy jewels for his wife or his mistress. Take any petty scoundrel you like. He again only  obeys an impulse. He seeks the satisfaction of a craving, or  he seeks to escape what would give him trouble.  
 We are almost ashamed to compare such petty scoundrels  with one who sacrifices his whole existence to free the oppressed, and like a Russian nihilist mounts the scaffold. So  vastly different for humanity are the results of these two  lives; so much do we feel ourselves drawn towards the one  and repelled by the other.  
 And yet were you to talk to such a martyr, to the woman  who is about to be hanged, even just as she nears the gallows,  she would tell you that she would not exchange either her life  or her death for the life of the petty scoundrel who lives on  the money stolen from his work-people. In her life, in the  struggle against monstrous might, she finds her highest joys.  Everything else outside the struggle, all the little joys of the  bourgeois and his little troubles seem to her so contemptible,  so tiresome, so pitiable! "You do not live, you vegetate,"  she would reply; "I have lived."  
 We are speaking of course of the deliberate, conscious acts  of men, reserving for the present what we have to say about  that immense series of unconscious, all but mechanical acts,  which occupy so large a portion of our life. In his deliberate,  conscious acts man always seeks what will give him pleasure.  
 One man gets drunk, and every day lowers himself to the  condition of a brute because he seeks in liquor the nervous  excitement that he cannot obtain from his own nervous system. Another does not get drunk; he takes no liquor, even  though he finds it pleasant, because he wants to keep the  freshness of his thoughts and the plentitude of his powers,  that he may be able to taste other pleasures which he prefers  to drink. But how does he act if not like the judge of good  living who, after glancing at the menu of an elaborate dinner rejects one dish that he likes very well to eat his fill of  another that he likes better.  
 When a woman deprives herself of her last piece of bread  to give it to the first comer, when she takes off her own scanty rags to cover another woman who is cold, while she  herself shivers on the deck of a vessel, she does so because  she would suffer infinitely more in seeing a hungry man,  or a woman starved with cold, than in shivering or feeling  hungry herself. She escapes a pain of which only those who  have felt it know the intensity.  
 When the Australian, quoted by Guyau, wasted away beneath the idea that he has not yet revenged his kinsman's  death; when he grows thin and pale, a prey to the consciousness of his cowardice, and does not return to life till he has  done the deed of vengeance, he performs this action, a heroic  one sometimes, to free himself of a feeling which possesses  him, to regain that inward peace which is the highest of  pleasures.  
 When a troupe of monkeys has seen one of its members fall  in consequence of a hunter's shot, and comes to besiege his  tent and claim the body despite  the threatening gun; when  at length the Elder of the band goes right in, first threatens  the hunter, then implores him, and finally by his lamentations induces him to give up the corpse, which the groaning  troupe carry off into the forest, these monkeys obey a feeling  of compassion stronger than all considerations of personal  security. This feeling in them exceeds all others. Life itself  loses its attraction for them while they are not sure whether  they can restore life to their comrade or not. This feeling becomes so oppressive that the poor brutes do everything to  get rid of it.  
 When the ants rush by thousands into the flames of the  burning ant-hill, which that evil beast, man, has set on fire,  and perish by hundreds to rescue their larvae, they again obey a craving to save their offspring. They risk everything for  the sake of bringing away the larvae that they have brought up with more care than many women bestow on their children.  
 To seek pleasure, to avoid pain, is the general line of action  (some would say law) of the organic world.  
 Without this quest of the agreeable, life itself would be impossible. Organisms would disintegrate, life cease.  
 Thus whatever a man's actions and line of conduct may be,  he does what he does in obedience to a craving of his nature.  The most repulsive actions, no less than actions which are  indifferent or most attractive, are all equally dictated by a  need of the individual who performs them. Let him act as  he may, the individual acts as he does because he finds a  pleasure in it, or avoids, or thinks he avoids, a pain.  
 Here we have a well-established fact. Here we have the  essence of what has been called the egoistic theory.  
 Very well, are we any better off for having reached this  general conclusion?  
 Yes, certainly we are. We have conquered a truth and  destroyed a prejudice which lies at the root of all prejudices.  All materialist philosophy in its relation to man is implied  in this conclusion. But does it follow that all the actions  of the individual are indifferent, as some have hastened to  conclude? This is what we have now to see.  
 
 
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